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Absolute Immunity for State-Law Torts
Under Westfall v. Erwin:' How Much Discretion is Enough?
Captain Karl R. Rabago*
Department of Law, United States Military Academy
Introduction
The plaintiff who seeks to maintain an action in tort
against a federal employee has basically two choices. First,
after complying with various procedural requirements, the
plaintiff may initiate suit under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) against the United States. 2 The act is a waiver
of sovereign immunity and, in spite of the existence of ex-
ceptions to its coverage, 3 has generally been interpreted
broadly.
The other alternative available to the plaintiff is a suit
against the employee in his individual capacity based upon
either state-law 4 or constitutionalI tort. One of the em-
ployee's first lines of defense against such actions is official
immunity. 6 Fairly distinct bodies of law have developed for
immunity in suits alleging constitutional torts 7 and those
based in state-law. Courts generally recognize absolute im-
munity from tort actions for executive officials in quasi-
judicial functions. I
A federal employee sued in state-law tort will seek the
protection of absolute immunity. The leading Supreme
Court case in the area is Barr v. Matteo. I The case had
come to stand for the rule that a federal employee was enti-
tled to absolute immunity against suit based in state-law
tort when the actions giving rise to the suit were "within
the outer perimeter of [the employee's] line of duty." 10 The
courts of appeals split on whether immunity also required
conduct that was "discretionary" in nature. "1 The Supreme
Court resolved this conflict in Westfall v. Erwin, 12 by unan-
imously holding that discretion was indeed a prerequisite to
absolute immunity. In spite of the Court's efforts to provide
some guidance for a workable definition of "discretion," the
case raises serious concerns over how federal officials
should function and when they can be held individually re-
sponsible for damages resulting from the performance of
their duties.
Westfall v. Erwin
William Erwin, Sr., a federal employee, was a warehouse-
man at an Army depot in Alabama, who sustained injuries
due to exposure to toxic soda ash while at the workplace.
He alleged that his supervisors, also federal employees,
were negligent in causing, permitting, or allowing him to
inhale the soda ash. Plaintiff alleged that the ash should not
*This article was originally submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the 36th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course.
108 S. Ct. 580 (1988). The author uses the term "state-law tort" to refer to all tort actions brought under state codified or common law.
228 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1982). Section 1346(b) provides that the United States may be sued in federal district court for damages for injuries or loss
of property caused by the negligent or wrongful conduct of a federal employee acting within the scope of his office or employment under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable according to the law of the place where the tort occurred. Section 2401(b) requires the tort claim
to be presented within two years after it accrues to the federal agency where the tortfeasor was employed when the tort occurred. The FTCA action must be
filed within six months of the agency's denial of the claim. Section 1402(b) places venue in the district where plaintiff resides or where the tort occurred.
'28 U.S.C. § 2680 lists areas where the United States has not waived sovereign immunity, including claims arising out of assault, battery, false imprison-
ment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, and interference with contractual relations. The only
remedy for plaintiffs alleging these torts is to sue the tortfeasor directly in state court.
4 Even if the action is not specifically precluded under an FTCA exception, see supra note 3, plaintiffs may choose suit under state law to avoid other provi-
sions of the act, to avoid the requirement to prove the defendant acted within the scope of his employment to obtain trial by jury and the possibility of
punitive damages, or simply to obtain representation by an attorney who would otherwise be limited to a statutory fee. See P. Schuck, Suing Government
41-43 (1983) [hereinafter Suing Government]. See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants; The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Dam-
ages, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281 (1981) [hereinafter Suing Our Servants]; Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 Case W. Res. 396
(1987); Comment, Tort Immunity of Federal Executive Officials: The Mutable Scope of Absolute Immunity, 37 Okla. L. Rev. 285 (1984); Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Damages Actions, 77 Hare. L. Rev. 209 (1963); Mayer, Immunity Denied to Federal Officials Failing to Perform Discretionary
Duties: Estrada v. Hills, 401 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Ill. 1975), 35 Fed. B.J. 206 (1976).
5 See generally Suing Government, supra note 4; Woolhandler, supra note 4; Comment, supra note 4.
6 Certain statutory provisions may immunize the employee and/or substitute the United States as the defendant. These statutory immunities can be catego-
rized according to the way in which protection is afforded. See, e.g.. 21 U.S.C. § 885(d) (1982) (immunizing all officials engaged in enforcement of the
Controlled Substances Act); 10 U.S.C. § 1089(a) (1982), 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1982) (providing that exclusive remedy is suit against United States); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2676 (1982) (recovery against United States precludes subsequent suit against individual); 10 U.S.C. § 1089(0 (1982) (allowing indemnification by United
States).
7 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (immunity from constitutional torts granted where official is performing discretionary functions insofar
as conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known"),
t See generally Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978); Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1987); Harper v. Jefferies, 808 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.
1986); Ryan v. Bilbey, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985).
9 360 U.S. 564 (1959). The Court decided the companion case, Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959), at the same time. The two cases are referred to
collectively as Barr v. Matteo.
10 Barr, 360 U.S. at 575.
1 See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 322 (1973) (holding that scope element alone was not the rule and suggesting a requirement for discretion). Compare
General Electric Co. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (4th Cir. 1987) and Poolman v. Nelson, 802 F.2d 304, 307 (8th Cir. 1986) (immunity attaches
for all acts performed within outer perimeters of scope of duties) with Johns v. Pettibone Corp., 769 F.2d 724, 728 (11 th Cir. 1985) and Araujo v. Welch, 742
P.2d 802, 804 (3d Cir. 1984) (immunity requires scope of duties and discretionary function).
12108 S. Ct. 580 (1988).
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have been stored in his warehouse, and that he should have
been warned of the presence and danger of the ash. Defend-
ants removed the state court action to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. 13
The district court granted summary judgment to the de-
fendants on the ground that they were immune from suit as
a matter of law because they were acting within the scope
of their duties when the alleged negligence occurred. '4 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals, I Ith Circuit, held that al-
though the district court had been correct in its
interpretation of the law at the time of the decision, an in-
tervening decision in another case placed the 11 th Circuit
with those circuits requiring that the complained-of acts al-
so be discretionary in nature. 1" Because a genuine dispute
over a material issue of fact existed as to the discretion is-
sue, summary judgment was inappropriate and the 1 lth
Circuit reversed the district court. 16 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the dispute among the circuits
on the need for discretion 11 and affirmed. 11
The Supreme Court began its analysis by returning to its
decisions in Barr v. Matteo 19 and Doe v. McMillan, 20 the
only precedent cited in the entire opinion. In those cases,
the Court explicated the original rationale for absolute im-
munity for government officials against suits for state-law
tort. The Court recognized that immunity grew from a bal-
ancing of the values of insulating the decision-making
process from the harassment of prospective litigation
against those of providing injured parties with remedies and
allocating accountability of tortfeasors. In addition to the
"outer perimeter" test of Barr, 21 the Court recognized a
discretionary function requirement. Next, the Court re-
jected a mechanical test for the application of the
discretionary function requirement, and placed the burden
for establishing entitlement to immunity squarely on the
party seeking to invoke its protection. The posture of the
case, 22 however, prevented any precise definitions of the
boundaries of official immunity or the level of discretion
necessary to obtain absolute immunity. The Court recom-
mended that Congress establish standards governing the
area. Finally, the Court held that future cases must balance
the competing factors to ensure the proper extension of the
protections of immunity.
The purpose of official immunity is to insulate the deci-
sion-making process from the harassment of prospective
litigation. 23 The underlying assumption is that federal offi-
cials who fear litigation and personal liability will be unduly
timid in the execution of their duties. 24 The most eloquent
statement of this principle appears in the opinion of Judge
Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle:
[T]o submit all officials, the innocent as well as the
guilty, to the burden of trial and to the inevitable dan-
ger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all but
the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the un-
flinching discharge of their duties . . . [I]t has been
thought in the end better to leave unredressed the
wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those
who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
retaliation. 25
However meritorious the protections afforded by absolute
official immunity, the injured party is denied recovery on an
otherwise valid claim simply because his tortfeasor is a fed-
eral official, and the federal official avoids judicial
accountability for misconduct. In striking a balance be-
tween these competing concerns, the Supreme Court held
that absolute immunity is justified only when the benefits of
immunity outweigh the "perhaps recurring harm to
individuals." 26
It is intuitively obvious that effective government and
fearless performance of duties by officials would be en-
hanced only when immunity attaches to acts within the
scope of the official's duties. This concept is best interpreted
broadly, so as to encompass the implicit as well as explicit
responsibilities of office. 27 Logic also dictates that the most
apparent socially negative effect of potential liability will be
in areas where a decision must be made and where that lia-
bility is not a desired element of the decision matrix. 28 The
premise of the Supreme Court's resolution of the conflict
over the need 'for a discretionary function requirement is
that potential liability only has an effect on conduct that is
3Id. at 582.
14 Erwin v. Westfall, 785 F.2d 1551, 1552 (1I1th Cir. 1987).
15 Johns v. Pettibone Corp., 769 F.2d 724, 728 (1Ith Cir. 1985).
16 Erwin v. Westfall, 785 F.2d at 1552-53.
17 Westfall v. Erwin, 107 S, Ct. 1346 (1987).
18 The precise holding of the Court was that "absolute immunity does not shield official functions from state-law tort liability unless the challenged conduct
is within the outer perimeter of an official's duties and is discretionary in nature." Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580, 585 (1988).
19 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
20 Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
21 Barr, 360 U.S. at 575.
22 Westfall, 108 S. Ct. at 585; see also supra text accompanying note 16.
23 Westfall, 108 S. Ct. at 583. See generally Suing Government. supra note 4; Suing Our Servants, supra note 4 (offering empirical justifications for immunity
based upon the calculus of official decision making). Cf Woolhandler, supra note 4 at 400-06 (suggesting that liability for executive acts serves a~parallel
purpose to requirements of judicial process for judicial behavior).
24 Westfall. 108 S. Ct. at 583.
25 Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950) (quoted at length in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 51-72
(1959)).
26 Westfall, 108 S. Ct. 583 (quoting Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 320 (1973)).
2 7 See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 575. I-
21 In fact, whether or not officials are empowered to make choices, they can respond to tear or threat of litigation and liability through delay, inaction,
building records, or substituting riskless behavior wherever possible. See Suing Our Servants, supra note 4 at 305-15. Logically, that society would benefit by
"free-market government" where, as in general tort law, liability served to conform conduct to social norms. Such effects, however, would only be noticed at
a level of decision making where immunity would clearly attach to an official's choices.
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a product of judgment or discretion, and that some tor-
tious, in-scope conduct will involve neither. 29
As an alternative to the argument that there should be no
\discretionary function element, defendants-petitioners ar'-
gued that immunity should attach as long as there was
present "minimal discretion." Under this model, petitioners
suggested that if the precise conduct were not mandated by
law, courts should regard the act as discretionary. The
Court reasoned that because virtually all official acts in-
volve some choice, this approach Would render the
discretionary function requirement meaningless, and, more
importantly, ignore the balance of benefits against costs es-
sential to ensuring that immunity attach only where its
purposes were served. 30 Conduct not entitled to absolute
immunity, then, is that "involv[ing] the exercise of a modi-
cum of choice and yet . . . largely unaffected by the
prospect of tort liability, making the provision of absolute
immunity unnecessary and unwise." 3
As a part of a judicial doctrine, Westfall represents the
essential third leg of a trilogy of absolute official immunity
cases. Until or unless Congress acts to establish standards
of its own, 32 case law will have to build upon what could
now be termed the Barr, Doe, and Westfall33 doctrine. For
this reason, a brief review of the decisions in Barr and Doe
is appropriate.
The Barr decision allowed absolute immunity based'upon
an explicit finding that the defendant had acted within the
outer scope of his official duties as a government employ-
ee. 34 Defendant Barr was sued in tort for an alleged
defamation resulting from the issuance of a'press release
concerning the imminent suspension of the plaintiffs, his
subordinates. 3 The Court recognized that executive official
immunity could not serve its basic purposes if it was limited
only to cabinet-rank officials. The scope of immunity is de-
termined not only by the function of, the government
official, but also by the nature of the acts involved. Of
course, the facts of the individual case would be determina-
tive and senior officials would receive immunity more often
than lower ranking employees. 36 The Barr Court did not
specifically require that the conduct complained of must be
discretionary. The Westfall Court, though, construes Barr
as turning on the discretionary nature of the defendant's
acts.
in Doe, the Court applied Barr to a case where two of the
defendants, federal' officials, were acting within the outer
perimeters of their duties, but did not appear to exercise
any discretion in performing the act allegedly causing the
plaintiff's injuries. "1 Plaintiffs sued a number of legislators,
federal employees, and District of Columbia officials for in-
vasion of privacy resulting from the publication and
dissemination of a congressional report. All the defendants
except the Public Printer and Superintendent of Documents
received immunity. As.to those officials, though the Court
found them to be acting within the scope of their duties, it
also found that they exercised no discretion with regard to
the offending report. The Court remanded the case to deter-
,mine other issues."3 First, the Court explained that Barr
did not establish a fixed, mechanical rule for immunity, but
rather recognized the guiding principles that must be
weighed in each case. Under Doe, the defendant must act
within the outer perimeter of his duties, but the inquiry
must continue. The official must also demonstrate that the
function which gave rise to the allegedly tortious acts em-
bodied a legitimate and desired exercise of discretion. Like
the Barr case, however, the Doe decision did not explicitly
require discretion as an element. Again, the Westfall Court
found that discretion in the particular function giving rise
to the lawsuit was crucial to the result. 39
As a result of this incomplete model for decision, the
conflict among the circuits arose. On one hand, some courts
adopted the view that the Barr decision required a discre-
tionary function element. 4 In opposition were cases
holding that the test lay in defining the outer limits of the
official's duties, though admitting that the discretionary na-
ture of the act complained of would affect the definition of
those limits. 4' Moreover, some courts saw Barr as applying
only to defamation suits, 42 while some cited it as control-
ling in all state-law actions. 4
The decision in Westfall is consistent with Barr and Doe
in recognizing the essential conflict between the protection
of the individual citizen against tortious injury, and the pro-
tection of the public interest through immunity for
government agents. " The balancing of these factors is the
consistent methodology for resolution of the three cases.
The Westfall decision puts to rest any suggestion that Barr
and Doe are to be confined to the governmental speech
area. 4 The Westfall decision also connects the Barr and
29 Westfall, 108 S. Ct. at 583-84.
30ld. at 584-85.31 ld
~"Id.
32 See infra text accompanying notes 66-75.
33 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Doe v. McMillian, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1988).
34 Barr, 360 U.S. at 575.
I' d. at 568.
36 1d. at 573.
37 Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 322-23 (1973).
38 Id. at 307-10, 324-25.
39 Id. at 322-23.
40 See, e.g., Johns v. Pettibone, 769 F.2d 724, 727 (11 th Cir. 1985).
41 See, e.g., Poolman v. Nelson, 802 F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir. 1986).
42 See Comment, supra note 4 at 295 n.72.
43 Id. at 295 n.73.
44 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 565 (1959).
45 See supra text accompanying note 13.
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Doe cases with an independent discretionary function ele-
ment and a cost-benefit analysis. If an official establishes
that the tort-producing conduct was within the outer pe-
rimeter of the scope of duties, and that the conduct was
discretionary in nature, it must then be shown that the situ-
ation is one where the public benefit of a grant of immunity
outweighs the loss occasioned by denying relief to the
plaintiff.
Federal officials, or their federal attorneys, can be ex-
pected to argue that Westfall creates more problems than it
resolves. Perhaps the most serious of these is uncertainty in
the performance of duties occasioned by inability to define
"discretionary." Most officials can easily determine, in ad-
vance, when their conduct is within the outer perimeters of
their duties. Because virtually all official conduct involves
some choice, the lack of dertainty about whether acts are
discretionary could produce exactly the timidity that abso-
lute immunity was created to prevent. Some of these
problems can be addressed and some of the effects of the
decision anticipated. Ultimately, the question is how to in-
terpret and apply the decision until, by legislation or
through the development of a body of case law, some mea-
sure of predictability returns to the area.
Problems with the Westfal Decision
An overview of the language of the Westfall decision
raises a number of serious questions about how it is to be
applied by the lower federal -courts. Obviously, the most
significant problems will be with attempts to define the term
"discretionary in nature."46 A section of the discussion be-
low is dedicated to that problem. First, however, an
examination of other problems is appropriate.
A more subtle, and yet potentially far-reaching issue
raised by the Westfall decision is whether it had any effect
on the Barr doctrine other than to clarify the existence of
the discretionary function element. The primary question is
whether the case modifies Barr's reliance on Gregoire v.
Biddle. 41
Although the decision states that the purpose of immuni-
ty is to protect officials from the harrassment of litigation,
the Court uses language that suggests that the only way
that effective government could be furthered by immunity is
by shielding officials from liability. In the course of three
sentences explaining why a discretionary function element
is required, the Court refers only to the threat of potential
liability. 4 One of the premises of the Barr doctrine was
that mere involvement in litigation is sufficiently debilitat-
ing to effective government to justify the existence of official
immunity. 41
The Court justifies its decision to impose a discretionary
function element as consistent with the functional analysis
in Doe and other immunity cases. 10 Functional analysis as
a methodology for determining whether absolute immunity
is available requires the defendant to leap two hurdles.
First, the defendant's position must encompass official du-
ties of a kind that warrants the protection of immunity.
Second, the act that gave rise to alleged liability must have
been the -result of the performance of a protected func-
tion."1 It is with this analysis that the Court limited
absolute immunity for Presidential aides in Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald. 5 2 Likewise, in Forrester v. White, the Court denied
absolute immunity from damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
to a. state court judge, whose decision to fire a court em-
ployee was deemed to be administrative as opposed to
judicial. 13 While there is an attractive symmetry to using
the substantially identical two-step analysis of Westfall for
officials sued for state-law torts, it is in application that the
theory breaks down.
Under Harlow, a safety net against frivolous suits and the
vexation of litigation is created by the objective test for
qualified immunity from constitutional torts. Under
Harlow, officials are shielded from liability only insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known. -4 Likewise, under Forrester, judges still enjoy
absolute immunity from damages for judicial acts. "1 In
their respective spheres, both tests provide reasonably ob-
jective,' workable criteria suitable for application at
summary judgment. 16
Unlike qualified immunity for constitutional torts and ab-
solute immunity for judicial acts, the Westfall standard
does not provide a safety net to protect against frivolous
46Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580, 585 (1988).
47 See Barr, 360 U.S. at 571-72.
48 Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1988).
The central purpose of official immunity, promoting effective government, would not be furthered by shielding an official from state-law tort liability
without regard to whether the alleged tortious conduct is discretionary in nature. When an official's conduct is not the product of independent judg-
ment, the threat of liability cannot detrimentally inhibit that conduct. It is only when officials exercise decision-making discretion that potential liability
may shackle the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government.
Westfall, 108 S. Ct. at 584 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
49 See Barr, 360 U.S. at 571. See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-30 (1985) (holding that a district court's denial of a claim of immunity is an
appealable "final decision" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment); Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police,
812 F.2d 1425, 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discovery sufficient to contest a motion for summary judgment is one of the burdens that immunity was designed to
protect against).
'o Westfall, 108 S. Ct. at 583 n.3,
51 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812-13 (1981).
52 Id.
3 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988).
54 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
55 Forrester, 108 S. Ct. at 543-44.
56 In Harlow, the Court devoted an extensive portion of the opinion to its explication of the test for qualified immunity and the importance of resolving
immunity issues at summary judgment. 457 U.S. at 413-20. While the ultimate holding of the Court was a limitation on the immunity of Presidential aides,
the objective test represents a practical approach to the resolution of competing interests conspicuously absent in Westfalt.
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lawsuits, artful pleading, or protracted discovery '7 to estab-
lish facts. The official sued under state-tort law is effectively
thrown out with the immunity bath water. The Court
makes no effort to establish the kind of objective criteria
found in Harlow and Forrester, and leaves a definition of
discretionary function to the lower courts. As the lower
courts wrestle with a definition of discretionary function, it
is conceivable that the area will become so fact-specific and
complex that the legal question of whether immunity is
available must await retrospective explication of the facts of
the individual case.
A shift in emphasis from prospective to retrospective
analysis violates the underlying rationale for immunity.
When the defendants argued that immunity should follow a
finding of "minimal discretion," an objective analysis based
upon whether or not conduct was expressly required by
statute or regulation, the Court responded that such a rule
would ignore the balancing test and the underlying pur-
poses of the official immunity doctrine. "1 The Barr Court
first recognized that immunity protects against the harass-
ment of litigation, allowing federal officials to expect that
they will not be sued for their official acts, and thereby en-
hancing efficient decision making. 9 Liability should also be
viewed prospectively, with an emphasis on its deterrent ef-
fect upon conduct by officials. The Westfall decision will
undoubtedly deter nondiscretionary actors. Due to the lack
of clearly articulated standards, the decision can also be ex-
pected to deter discretionary actors who don't know how to
define their conduct. The lower courts are left with the
enormous task of creating a test that is clear and capable of
application at summary judgment.
One district court recently indicated that analysis of the
/ " immunity defense requires no more than examination of
plaintiff's allegations. 60 The Tenth Circuit, in a pre-
Westfall decision, has stated that immunity is an issue that
can be decided as a matter of law at summary judgment.6
The threat of protracted litigation and resulting interference
with government could become significant absent recom-
mitment to disposition of cases at the earliest stage.
The Court made it clear that the government official has
the burden of proving entitlement to immunity. 62 The ques-
tion is how the official is expected to prove entitlement to
immunity at summary judgment. Minimal discretion is in-
sufficient. 63 Beyond that, officials and agency attorneys
must await development of the definition of discretionary.
Meanwhile, officials remain uncertain of whether they will
be liable for the consequences of performing their assigned
duties.
Another potentially troublesome phrase in the precise
holding of Westfall is the reference to testing whether the
"challenged" conduct of the official is within the outer pe-
rimeter of an official's duties and is discretionary in
nature. " The question is whether such a term would allow
the plaintiff to control the existence of immunity merely
through a calculated focus on an insufficiently discretionary
act. Sufficiently fine slicing could separate every allegedly
tortious act from an official function. Alternatively, the
plaintiff would only have to identify some employee or offi-
cial in the casual chain who could not meet the
discretionary function requirement. In the multilayered bu-
reaucracy characteristic of the federal government, it is
likely that such a person always exists. These possibilities
suggest two additional problems potentially resulting from
the Westfall decision. First, defendants can fairly be ex-
pected to advocate "derivative" immunity for non-
discretionary acts performed at the behest of superior offi-
cials performing discretionary functions. Derivative
immunity was rejected by the Court in Harlow as inconsis-
tent with the functional approach to immunity. 6 Where
officials may operate under objective guidance and criteria
concerning immunity, this rationale is sound. The undefina-
ble nature of the discretionary function element in a state-
law tort context may justify a revisiting of the derivative
immunity concept in order to ensure that government is not
unduly impinged by threats of protracted litigation and po-
tential liability. Further, it would not be inconsistent with a
functional analysis approach to view a particular discretion-
ary function as extending vertically through several levels
of responsibility, thus protecting both policy makers and
policy implementers.
Second, Westfall may encourage plaintiffs to focus their
allegations on "ministerial" acts and actors. The decision
may subvert a stated goal of the functional approach, pro-
viding recovery to injured parties, by directing law suits
against officials who may well be judgment-proof due to
their lower status'in the bureaucracy. The courts could re-
solve these dilemmas through a careful analysis of the true
nature and cause of the injury alleged, a broad interpreta-
tion of official "functions," and by refusing to be bound
merely by the allegations of the complaint.
As part of the resolution of immunity issues, the Court
requires a balancing of elements, and immunity is possible
only where the benefits to effective government outweigh
potential harm to plaintiffs. The overall posture of the bal-
ancing test required by the Court is unclear. The question is
whether the test constitutes a separate third prong of the of-
ficial immunity decision matrix, or whether it is inherent in
examining for a discretionary function. Curiously, in some
cases before Westfall, the need to balance benefits against
costs was adopted as a "necessity test" and as a justification
57 Insubstantial lawsuits should not be allowed to proceed to trial, as they undermine the effectiveness of government as contemplated by our constitutional
structure. Firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is fully warranted in such cases. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 n.35 (citing Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978)).
" Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580, 584-85 (1988).
"Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
6
°Owens v. Turnage, 681 F. Supp. 1095, 1097 n.3 (D.N.J. 1988).
61 See Chavez v. Singer, 698 F.2d 420, 421 (10th Cir. 1983).q 62 Westfall, 108 S. Ct. at 585.
63 Id. at 584-85, see also text accompanying note 29.
6Id.
6 5 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810-11 (1981).
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for not applying a discretionary function test. 66 The opin-
ion in Westfall. however, appears to conclude that the
balancing test is a guiding' principle best implemented by
the discretionary function and outer-perimeter tests. In
light of the difficulty inherent in a judicial approach to the
social question of balancing public benefits against individu-
al harms, the balancing test perhaps best remains an
underlying consideration, used to validate the results of the
two-prong test of scope and discretion.
The Court's holding requires that the challenged conduct
be discretionary in nature. Aside from the creation of a
"floor" level of discretion at some point more than "not
specifically required by statute or regulation," the Court
provides no definition of the requirement other than refer-
ence to the underlying balancing of competing interests. 67
The issue is of paramount importance to government em-
ployees because potential exposure to suit guides many acts
of choice that rest in the broad gray area between acts that
are purely ministerial and those that are totally discretion-
ary in nature. 61 Unfortunately, courts have wrestled with
the problem in the past and have been unable to develop a
workable definition.
The problems associated with developing a definition
from the Westfall opinion begin with deciding the opera-
tional phrase, whether it is "discretionary," "discretionary
in nature," or "conduct [that] is discretionary in nature." 69
This dilemma is more' than semantic because the courts ul-
timately will decide whether the particular act must be the
product of discretion, or merely the product of generally
discretionary conduct. Other questions in need of answers
include whether inaction is conduct, and whether there can
be non-conduct of a discretionary nature. One troubling in-
dication of where the Court may be heading in this area
appears in Berkovitz v. United States, "I a case involving the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The plain-
tiff, who contracted polio after ingesting an oral polio
vaccine, alleged that the Department of Biologic Standards,
then a part of the National Institute of Health, negligently
failed to follow its own mandatory regulations in approving
the manufacture and distribution of the vaccine. The Court
held that the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA1, did not protect the United States from liability
when federal employees deviate from mandatory proce-
dures. 72 In discussing whether an employee is exercising
discretion in implementing a regulatory procedure, the
Court, citing Westfall, said "if the employee's conduct can-
not appropriately be the product of judgement or choice,
then there is no discretion in the conduct for the discretion-
ary function exception to protect."' 3 While on its face this
..may seem to be a rather straightforward approach to the
problem,, upon analysis, the implications for the federal em-
ployee are serious., Assume that the employees charged with
certifying the safety and efficacy of the vaccine followed the
regulations to the letter, but the regulatory scheme itself
was deficient, and an unsafe vaccine was produced. The in-
jured plaintiff wouldibe barred from suing the United States
because the discretionary function exception to the FTCA
retains sovereign immunity for claims "based upon an act
or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising
due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, wheth-
er or not such statute or regulation be valid. ... " -4 The
individual employee may n't be so fortunate. Westfall re-
quires discretionary activity before immunity is appropriate
and Berkovitz says that a federal employee following regula-
tions is not exercising discretion. Thus, in the hypothetical
mentioned above, the United States escapes liability while
the employee following the mandatory regulations is not
entitled to immunity because no discretionary conduct is
involved. 11
Obviously, no simple answer exists to the dilemma posed
above. Because the issue is so value-laden, perhaps one sim-
ple answer cannot and should not exist. Nonetheless, the
courts have attempted a definition; some of their efforts
may be revealing.
The FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for torts
resulting from acts performed in the course of a discretion-
ary function. 76 Some have suggested that the case law and
standards developed under the FTCA should apply to abso-
lute immunity. While a few courts have adopted the FTCA
standard for official immunity, 77 the better reasoned opin-
ions have rejected a wholesale merger on the basis of
underlying policy. ' 8 The courts that have, argued that offi-
cial immunity doctrine and FTCA discretionary function
66See Garner v. Rathburn, 346 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1965); Ove Gustavsson Contractiig Co. v. Floete, 299 F.2d 655 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827
(1962).
67 Westfall, 108 S. Ct. at 585; see supra text accompanying note 16.
68See Suing GoVernment. supra note 4, at 68-81 ("inhere are strong reasons to regard official self-protection as a significant and growing problem,"). See
also Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers. 129 U., Pa. L. Rev. 1110 (1981) (concluding that individual response to liability, while not empirically verifi-
able, would likely be some kind of "shirking" action, and that enterprise liability is a better mechanism for securing appropriate official behavior); Shepsle,
Official Errors and Official Liability. 42 Law & Contemp. Probs. 35 (1978) (suggesting, in the context of a decisional model, that civil liability of officials may
have effects on decision-making more closely correlated to the types of errors inherent in particular decision processes as opposed to characteristics of gov-
ernmental functions).
69 The current edition of Words and Phrases contains nearly 50 pages of citations defining terms spanning from "discretion" through "discretionary rower."
Words and Phrases, "Discretion" (1954 & Supp. 1987).
'0 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988).
'1 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
72 108 S, Ct. at 1959 (1988).
73 Id.
'4 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
75 See supra note 65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concept of "derivative" immunity and how it may protect the individual.
7628 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982) (FTCA does not apply to any claim "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretion- c--
ary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused").
77See, e.g., Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 737-38 (10th Cir. 1977).
78See Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 770-73 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Estate of Burks v. Ross, 438 F.2d 230, 234 (6th Cir. 1971).
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exception are quite different and should be treated so, main-
tain that the FTCA is designed to provide a remedy
through a broad waiver of sovereign immunity, and that ex-
ceptions to that waiver be interpreted narrowly in order to
give greatest effect to the intent of the FTCA. Absolute im-
N munity is designed to effectuate good government while
recognizing that some valid claims must go unremedied. 19
A crucial difference in focus is mandated under the FTCA,
which is concerned first with providing the broadest remov-
al of barriers to recovery, and the absolute immunity area
of the law, which is designed to promote government by re-
moving even the fear of suit and liability. Additionally,
while the discretionary function exception of the FTCA has
been limited to policy decisions at high levels, recent cases
have suggested a broader reach. ' 0 The functional analysis
approach, when adapted to the FTCA body of law, tends to
expand the coverage of the discretionary function exception
by embracing more than just top level policy makers. On
the contrary, in the absolute immunity area, functional
analysis seems to narrow the range of protected functions
performed by lower level officials. The Supreme Court's de-
cision in United States v. VARIG Airlines is an excellent
example. "1 In that case, the Court reversed a lower court
decision that had held the FTCA's discretionary function
exception applicable only to policy-making discretion. In
extending the application of the discretionary function ex-
ception, the Court noted that it is "the nature of the
conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that gov-
erns."' 2 The predictability offered as an advantage to
aligning the two definitions may be illusory as well as in-
consistent with policy. Without legislation to deal with the
difficulties of the discretionary function test, courts will
have to rely on the opinions of the courts of appeals that
. applied the test and presaged the Westfall decision.
The circuits that applied a discretionary function test
agreed somewhat about a correct analysis. Not surprisingly,
the cases reflect an awareness of the underlying policy con-
flict between officials and the individual, and reflect a
functional analysis. The Tenth Circuit identified a range of
functions that progressed from ministerial acts, through
discretionary acts not entitled to immunity, to clearly dis-
cretionary acts at a planning or policy level. The conduct of
the official was analyzed and a label applied. Only clearly
discretionary conduct is entitled to immunity. This method-
ology is consistent with the circuit's interpretation of
commonality between the FTCA and official immunity defi-
nitions of discretionary functions, and limits immunity
primarily to highly placed officials,' 3 but unduly narrows
the availability of absolute immunity for others.
The Fifth Circuit used a necessity test that focused not
on the conduct of the official, but on the need to free the of-
ficial from fear or threat of suit and liability. " This was
also the original Tenth Circuit rule. ' 5 Because the necessity
test does not also address the potential harm to individual
plaintiffs in a balancing test, the Westfall decision would
seem to overrule this approach. ' 6
In some circuits, "discretionary" is defined simply as
"not ministerial." ' 7 Where those courts would grant immu-
nity for what the Westfall Court termed minimally
discretionary acts, the view may no longer represent good
law. "1 A better view is that ministerial acts encompass not
only conduct mandated by law or regulation, but some oth-
er lower level execution of duties as well. Somewhere
between the Tenth Circuit's unduly narrow approach and
the now partially invalid definitions of other courts lies the
proper scope of the absolute immunity defense. It would be
folly, though, to presume that Westfall's progeny in the
lower courts will be uniform. At best, officials must hope
that courts will recognize a few guiding principles.
Two recent cases from the Eleventh Circuit demonstrate
the inconsistency that is likely to result as courts apply
Westfall's discretionary function element. In Scott v.
DeMenna, 9 the court found discretion in a Department of
Agriculture employee's decision to report a police raid on a
farm. The official's job description included a duty to report
"unusual occurrences" that might affect farm prices in a
newsletter published by the Department. Because the offi-
cial's job description did not codify a definition of unusual
occurrences, the court found the selection of reported topics
to be a discretionary function and reversed the denial of de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment. 90 This result
resembles the minimal discretion position advanced by de-
fendants in Westfall.
In Johns v. Pettibone Corp., 91 the court held that a con-
tract decision to delegate provision of safety measures at a
TVA construction project to an independent contractor was
an exercise of discretion entitled to immunity under
Westfall. The court adhered to the Eleventh Circuit rule
79 See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
goSee Johns v. Pettibone Corp., 843 F.2d 464 (11 th Cir. 1988) (holding that in Eleventh Circuit, where discretionary function is interpreted identically in
both FICA and official immunity areas, government employees exercised discretion in delegating provision of safety measures to independent contractor).
See also United States v. VARIG Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
81 United States v. VARIG Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
2 Id. at 813. Cf. Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988) (rejecting per se discretionary function status for all regulatory functions in favor of the
functional analysis approach).
83 See Nietert v. Overby, 816 F.2d 1464, 1467 (10th Cir. 1987); Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 737-38 (10th Cir. 1977).
T See Williamson v. United States Dep't Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 378-80 (5th Cir. 1987).
"
5See Garner v. Rathburn, 346 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1965).
86 This is especially so in light of the way some courts used the necessity test to justify not applying a discretionary function test. See supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
07 See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 824 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 419 U.S. 882 (1974); Estate of Burks v. Ross, 438 F.2d 230, 235 (6th Cir. 1971);
David v. Cohen, 407 F.2d 1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1969).C s See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
'9840 F.2d 8 (11th Cir. 1988).
90 Scott v. DeMenna, 840 F.2d at 9.
91843 F.2d 464 (11th Cir. 1988).
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that the conditions under which absolute immunity is avail-
able are congruent with those justifying application of the
discretionary function exception -in FTCA actions,92 but
emphasized that determination of discretionary acts was
not based on rigid distinction between planning and opera-
tional decisions. 93 Yet, the same authority cited for the
FTCA/official immunity congruence rule has been cited by
the Eleventh Circuit as establishing that the proper test is
one based on a planning versus operational analysis. 91
These cases demonstrate that even where courts purport
to have established discretionary function definitions and
analytical methodologies, uncertainty will result in official
immunity cases. Likewise, courts that did not previously
apply a discretionary fuiction test cannot simply adopt ex-
isting methodologies.
However discretion is defined, the most common denomi-
nator is that a discretionary act involves the exercise of
judgment. In fact, the variety of resolutions in the cases is
made uniform through this concept. 9 Merely stating that
discretion involves the exercise of judgment, like broad the-
oretical definitions advanced, 9 6 is of little benefit to the low
or middle level official who, absent practical guidance, may
be less than fearless in the execution of duties due to
threatened liability. Likewise, describing conduct as plan-
ning or operational, ministerial or discretionary, provides
little guidance because all employees plan their activities to
some extent and exercise some discretion in the perfor-
mance of their duties.
If any distinction between these terms exists, it is a mat-
ter of degree. 97 Perhaps the greatest difficulty lies not in
denying recovery to injured plaintiffs, but in assessing liabil-
ity against the lower level official who only tries to follow
orders while those who make the decisions go free. 91 As
long as the best judicial remedy is only to deny recovery, or
impose liability upon those who merely execute the orders
of decision makers, no precise definition should be given.
Until Congress acts to remedy the situation as only that
body can, the scope of immunity must remain subject to
imprecise variables associated with social values. As one
court stated:
[O]bjective standards are notably lacking when the
question is not negligence but social wisdom, not due
care but political practicality, not reasonableness but
economic expediency. Tort law simply furnishes an in-
adequate crucible for testing the merits of social,
political, or economic decisions."
The shading that courts give to acts at the cusp between
ministerial and discretionary or mandatory and judgmental
may, in the end, be a function of the desirability of the con-
duct involved. So even in the Tenth Circuit, where the rule
is stated as limiting immunity to acts involving "judgment,
planning, or policy" (a relatively narrow concept derived
from the FTCA's discretionary function exception), the
term "judgment" was expanded to immunize a clerk's deci-
sion to report alleged misconduct of a supervisor. 1io While
this may seem as unprincipled as defining all conduct not
specifically required by law as at least "minimally discre-
tionary," such reasoning demonstrates that the desirability
of the employee's conduct must be the touchstone, not the
rigid categorization of behavior.
Legislative Response to Westfall
The Court in Westfall recognized the difficulties inherent
in judicial attempts to define the scope of absolute immuni-
ty. Congress is best suited to gather the empirical data
necessary and to assign weight to the relevant components
of the decision process. Because of Congress' broad powers,
it alone has the capability to immunize the official, provide
recovery to the injured party, allocate the cost of immunity
to the sector of society that benefits by it most, and pre-
scribe provisions to ensure the existence of some kind of
deterrence against repeated misconduct.
Congress is no stranger to statutory immunity, and in the
past fifteen years has enacted several measures revealing its
ability to assess and address the considerations mentioned
above. 101 For example, when Congress determined that the
impact of litigation would undermine the ability of the mili-
tary to provide quality health care, Congress enacted the
Gonzales Act. 102 Under that act, military doctors are im-
munized from malpractice suits, the United States is
substituted as defendant, and actions must be prosecuted
under FTCA procedures. Similar statutes exist immunizing
Department of Defense attorneys 103 and government
drivers. 104
Congress can appropriately tailor its reponses to particu-
lar needs and degrees of need. For example, in the face of
9 Id. at 467 n.2.
"Id. at 466.
9 4 Andrews v. Benson, 809 F.2d 1537, 1542 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Franks v. Bolden, 774 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1985)).
95 See, e.g.. Nietert v. Overby, 816 F.2d 1464, 1467 (10th Cir. 1987) (even narrow view of Tenth Circuit rule expanded where low level conduct involves
judgment).
96"Jurisdiction" may be defined as the right to
exercise government power over a defined class of persons or things in defined situations. "Authority" may be defined as the scope of governmental
power that can be exercised over the persons or things over, which the official has jurisdiction. "Discretion" could be defined as the right to decide
whether jurisdiction exists and to determine the limit of authority.
Comment, supra note 4 at 290.
97 See Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580, 584 (1988); Suing Our Servants, supra note 4 at 303-04; Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 990 (4th Ed. 1971).
98 Prosser, supra note 97 at 990.
99Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
10DSee Nietert v. Overby, 816 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1987).
101 See supra note 6.
1o2 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (1982). See Bass v. Parsons, 577 F. Supp. 944, 948 (S.D.W. Va. 1984).
103 10 U.S.C. § 1054 (1982).
104 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1982).
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the Bivens decision, 10' Congress liberalized the FTCA by
allowing suit for the most numerous of the Bivens-type
suits. The amendment broadened the FTCA waiver of sov-
ereign immunity and allowed suits against the United States
for certain intentional torts committed by federal law en-
Sforcement officers. "0" Although some saw the amendment
as only a small first step in providing remedies for constitu-
tional abuses, 107 Congress has not seen fit to expand the
scope of the remedy.
A legislative response to the Westfall decision should sat-
isfy certain criteria. First, officials should be protected not
only from potential liability, but also from the harassment
of litigation. The complexity inherent in attempting to de-
fine a discretionary function indicates that, especially for
the lower level employee, the issue might not be capable of
resolution by summary judgment. l0 Second, the cost of
public official's misfeasance, if not borne by the official,
must be placed on the element of society that profits most
by the protection of officials. Because the general public is
said to reap the benefit of the good government resulting
from fearless execution of duties by officials, the public
should bear the cost of immunity. Third, to satisfy expecta-
tions of fairness, the forum should be judicial, and the
mechanism a lawsuit. Fourth, judicially-created immunities
must play no part in the action. Fifth, otherwise valid prin-
ciples of federal tort law, such as the Fres doctrine, 109
must be preserved. Finally, officials, no longer facing liabili-
ty, must be deterred from negligent conduct through some
system of accountability and discipline. 110
A legislative remedy must, therefore, be responsive and
predictable. It must be responsive to the competing inter-
ests inherent in a correct resolution of the immunity
r., question. It must be predictable to guide or unencumber of-
ficial conduct. Legislative changes like those proposed by
former Attorney General Bell in 1979 " generally serve
these criteria.
Legislation should be in the form of amendments to the
FTCA. Federal employees should receive immunity from
suits alleging torts under state-law arising from acts per-
formed within the employee's scope of duties. Second, the
statute must substitute the United States as defendant in the
action. Third, the action should be governed by the provi-
sions of the FTCA. Fourth, the statute should not permit
the United States to raise common law or judicially created
official immunity as a defense, but it should allow the Unit-
ed States to raise defense otherwise valid under the FTCA.
Finally, Congress should enact provisions allowing for
administrative hearings ultimately empowered to discipline
officials. Plaintiffs who have obtained money judgments
should be empowered to initiate administrative process.
While some legitimate government functions may entail in-
juries to individuals, building an administrative record of
review should encourage agencies to explore alternative
courses of conduct. By allowing successful plaintiffs to initi-
ate such process, the public may be confident that agencies
do not blindly incorporate tortious conduct into standard
operating procedures. Agencies should adopt some adminis-
trative procedure to receive' such reports, investigate them,
and ultimately impose necessary discipline. Additionally,
disciplinary procedures should be sufficiently flexible to
identify responsible officials even where actions are brought
against the United States in the first instance. For example,
the Army's litigation regulation requires reports to the De-
partment of Army concerning all lawsuits against the Army
or Army officials. 12 Such a centralized information-gather-
ing system could be easily adapted to identify responsible
parties. Errant officials should not escape responsibility
merely because the United States was the named defendant.
Further, Congress should make some provision for mone-
tary recovery from former employees. This is not to suggest
that administrative sanctions should be applied in every in-
stance. Rather, such a system would allow agencies to
identify, using their specialized knowledge of their func-
tions, where injury-producing conduct warrants individual
sanction. At the same time, such sanctions would be inde-
pendent of any judicial remedy to injured plaintiffs.
This proposal addresses the key concerns that a legisla-
tive response to Westfall must contain. Although it could
be argued that legislation is inappropriate until or unless
the federal courts adopt an oppressive standard for the dis-
cretionary-function element, waiting for the development of
judicial doctrine can be exasperating. Defendant Barr was a
named defendant during six years of litigation before the
Supreme Court's final opinion. "I The resulting Barr doc-
trine was not finally clarified by Westfall for another
twenty-eight years.
Conclusion
The decision in Westfall represents another attempt to
fashion a legislative remedy in a judicial furnace. The re-
sults, though well-reasoned and well-founded, are not
adaptable to their purpose. The Court itself recognizes its
limited ability to respond to the needs of federal officials to
remain free from the threat of litigation and liability, and at
the same time, to the injured individual's need for compen-
sation. The problem is made more complex by the
recognition, but not definition, of a class of officials who ex-
ercise sufficient power to inflict injury, but insufficient
discretion and authority to avoid the consequences of their
tortious conduct. Because these individuals can be expected
to in turn name their supervisors as defendants, thereby
creating a conflict of interest within the agency, they may
105Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
'0628 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982).
107 See Bell, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Torts Claims Act, 16 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 5 n.19 (1979).
l0s See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
109 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (barring claims by servicemen arising out of or in the course of activity incident to service).
O 110See Suing Our Serants, supra note 4 at 361-67; Bell, supra note 107 at 12-15, 16.
111 See supra note 107.
112 Army Reg. 27-40, Legal Services: Litigation, para. 2-3 (4 Dec. 1985).
113 See Suing Government. supra note 4 at 40-41.
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face the difficulty of litigation and liability alone. "14 Even if
discretion is ultimately defined very broadly, one of the
principles of tort liability is to allow individuals to conform
their behavior to social standards of care, and more impor-
tantly, to predict the results of their conduct. To require
public servants to operate in the interim with no definable
standards for potential liability is a burden they should not
have to bear simply because they chose government
employment.
Editor's Note-At the time this article went to print, House
Bill 4612 (Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort
Compensations Act) had passed the House of Representatives
and the Senate. The bill amends Title 28, United States
Code, and provides for an exclusive remedy against the Unit-
ed States for suits based upon certain negligent or wrongful
acts or omissions of U.S. employees committed within the
scope of their employment.
114See generally id. at 82-89; 28 C.F.R. § 50.16(a).
